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After expanding in the 1970s, unionism in Britain contracted substantially over the next two
decades.  This paper argues that the statutory reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were of less
consequence in accounting for the decline of  unionism than the withdrawal of the state’s indirect
support for collective bargaining. The principal goal of the reforms was to boost productivity so the
paper examines the link between unions and productivity finding only a small association by the end
of the 1990s. Private sector unionism has become highly decentralized which renders it vulnerable
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1 While physical capital and human capital refer to the machines and skills that augment an
organization’s or an individual’s productivity, social capital alludes to aspects of the social structure
such as trust, networks, and conventions that encourage collaboration and coordination for shared
advantage.  Social capital is not embodied in a single organization or single individual, but in the
relations among organizations and individuals.  See Coleman (1988).




An assessment of unionism in a society may be organized around three classes of
questions: do unions produce a better distribution of income in society?; do unions contribute to a
more efficient society?; and do unions enhance a society’s “social capital”?
1  The first two questions
are the familiar distributional and efficiency considerations that figure in any interesting economic
question.  The third class of questions is less familiar to economists.  It concerns aspects of social
organization such as civic responsibility and engagement that enhance self-government and
voluntary cooperation. Associations such as labor unions are an important component of a society’s
network of institutions that give individuals an opportunity to shape their environment and to
promote mutual assistance.  Collective bargaining can be a constructive force at the workplace to
resolve problems that arise from the necessary incompleteness of labor contracts and, in this way,
unionism has the potential of being an effective vehicle for representing workers’ concerns and for
influencing their work conditions.  At the same time, unionism has the potential to be a destructive
agent.  It can frustrate cooperation, incite antagonisms, and create hardship.  Whether, on balance,
unionism is a source that adds to or detracts from a society’s “social capital” is a matter for
determination in any particular context.
In the context of Britain over the past forty years or so, the condition of unionism has
changed remarkably.  In the 1970s, the union movement in Britain appeared strong: the leadership
was consulted on important matters of economic policy, union membership and density were rising,
and a Royal Commission (the Bullock Commission) proposed putting union leaders on company
boards.  This strength arose not because collective bargaining was explicitly supported by a
favorable statutory framework, but because various indirect ways had been devised to promote2
2 Though linked to the earlier surveys, the 1998 Survey was renamed the Workplace Employee
Relations Survey.  The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys will be referenced subsequently as
WIRS (year) and, in 1998, as WERS (1998).
unionism.  This indirect support had been nurtured by governments of different political stripe and
found favor with the electorate which habitually expressed approval of collective bargaining as a
system for determining labor contracts.
This broad consensus broke down by the close of the 1970s.  There were several
reasons for this.  Increasingly, Britain’s lacklustre productivity performance was attributed to
restrictive work practices enforced by unions.  The system of collective bargaining was implicated
in the accelerating rate of price inflation.  A succession of strikes imposed a good deal of hardship
on the community.  For these and perhaps other reasons, the public’s support for unionism reached
a low point in 1979 when a new government was elected to power. Even though public support for
unionism recovered quickly, the new government pursued an active policy of taming the power and
reach of unions.  It was as if, at a relatively brief moment of the electorate’s disenchantment with
unionism, the government seized the opportunity to curb collective bargaining over the subsequent
fifteen years or so and to subject it to disciplines that have left it debilitated.  The retreat of unionism
is illustrated by the drop in the fraction of workers who are union members in Figure 1 and by the
decline in strike activity in Figure 2. By the year 2000, unionism’s role in private industry looks
precarious especially in light of its difficulty in organizing new establishments.  I have found
nothing in the writing in the 1970s on unions and industrial relations that forecast this change in
fortunes.  From the perspective of the 1970s, this retreat of union Britain is surprising.
This experience raises many important questions.  What caused unionism’s retreat?
How has the decline in collective bargaining affected the growth and distribution of incomes?  What
is the prevailing link between productivity and unionism?  How has the decline in unionism affected
the workplace experience of employees?  How have unions themselves been affected by this reduced
status?  Answers to these questions are offered in this paper drawing heavily on previous research
and making use especially of the detailed data derived from the four Workplace Industrial Relations
Surveys conducted in Britain in 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998.
2  This and other information will be
used to describe the changes that have taken place.  However, while these and other data allow for
a description of the changes, identifying causal relations requires a heavy dose of judgment.  Indeed,
the perennial problem with issues in labor relations is in unscrambling causal relationships where3
the key forcing variables are often unmeasured or poorly measured.
The paper proceeds by sketching the state of unionism in the 1960s and 1970s
arguing that, unlike most other countries, British unionism was nurtured less by explicit statutory
support and more by various indirect mechanisms.  Because of the importance of these indirect
mechanisms, the statutory reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were probably of less consequence in
accounting for the decline of  unionism than the withdrawal of the state’s indirect support for
collective bargaining. Perhaps the principal goal of the reforms was to break the link between
unionism and low productivity so the paper addresses what is known about unions and productivity
with special emphasis on what remains of the association between productivity and unionism in the
late 1990s.  Some original research on this issue is presented.  Section V asks how workers are
benefitting from unionism today and general conclusions complete the paper.
II. The Condition of Unionism in the 1960s and 1970s
General Overview
In the 1960s and 1970s, Britain’s labor markets and industrial relations practices
came under increasing scrutiny.  This was manifested not only in extensive public debate of the
issues and the establishment of a Royal Commission (the Donovan Commission) in 1965, but also
in an increasingly active statutory agenda.  A principal reason for this scrutiny grew out of the
realization that Britain’s rate of economic growth was inferior to almost all comparable economies
and that Britain frequently scored poorly in comparisons of productivity across countries.  Many
explanations were offered for these chastening international comparisons, but the role of industrial
relations was frequently alluded to.  
For example, Patten’s (1976) comparison of the productivity of companies with
operations in more than one country in the early 1970s found that those company divisions in Britain
had a poor productivity record and he ascribed an important part of this to union-enforced restrictive
work practices, over-manning, and strikes.  Prais’s (1981) study of manufacturing industry came to
similar sobering conclusions about British productivity and again identified the poor state of labor
relations in Britain as partly responsible.  One feature of British industrial relations that came in for
frequent censure in accounting for these productivity patterns was the multiplicity of unionism.
Such a union structure was said to contribute to jurisdictional disputes and to give undue emphasis4
3 See, for instance, Aylen’s (1982) study of the steel industry in Britain, Germany, and the United
States.
4 Metcalf’s useful surveys (1989, 1990) list only two relevant studies prior to 1980 and one of these
relates to unionism before the First World War.  
5 In the classic account of movements in the share of wages in national income in Britain by Phelps
Brown and Hart (1952), unions are given a role, but it is largely a secondary one: “The course of the
trade cycle brought.....changes in the effective strength of trade unions.  From time to time there
were some greater and in part exogenous changes in union strength.  Whether these changes affected
the relative size of wages and profits depended on the market environment” (p. 274).
6 In the special case of workplaces with a pre-entry closed shop, these gaps were larger: 15 percent
for semi-skilled and 10 percent for skilled workers.
to the interests of narrow occupational groups.
3
However, by the end of the 1970s, the link established by economists between
unionism and productivity was circumstantial.  Though some case studies indicated that unions were
defending work practices that harmed productivity, sufficient evidence had not been accumulated
to justify a statement to the effect that, in general, unionism harmed productivity.
4  Nevertheless, this
belief came to be widely shared and contributed to the view that unions were a drag on productivity
and economic growth.
In their distributional activities, the popular view was that unions were involved in
a constant effort to reallocate incomes away from dividends and interest and towards wages and
salaries.  In fact, economists brought forward little evidence that unionism materially affected the
distribution of national income in this way.
5  More attention was directed to the association between
unionism and individual earnings.  The first empirical studies of union-nonunion wage gaps in
Britain were appearing in the 1970s, but the available data at that time did not permit confident
inferences.  Subsequent research suggests that the wage gaps were modest. For instance, Stewart
(1991) estimates union-nonunion wage gaps in 1980 of almost 7 percent for semi-skilled workers
and 2 percent for skilled workers.
6  This suggests that unionism had modest effects on the wage
structure.   However, unions’ efforts to redistribute incomes toward wages contributed
to chronic upward pressure on wages and prices.  When a firm or industry experiences wage
increases induced by collective bargaining, typically a contraction in employment and output is to
be expected.  The issue then becomes the policy-making authorities’ response to this wage-induced
employment reduction.  Britain’s tragic experience with unemployment between the two World5
7 From 1921 until the outbreak of the Second World War, national insurance unemployment rates
were above ten percent for every year except 1927 when the unemployment rate was 9.7 percent.
8 Another fixed point was the foreign exchange rate although several times devaluation was the
chosen option to adjust to macroeconomic disequilibrium.
9 Hicks (1955, p. 391) wrote, “....the world we now live in is one in which the monetary system has
become relatively elastic, so that it can accommodate itself to changes in wages, rather than the other
way about.  Instead of actual wages having to adjust themselves to an equilibrium level, monetary
policy adjusts to the equilibrium level of money wages so as to make it conform to the actual level.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that instead of being on a Gold Standard, we are on a Labour
Standard”.
10 In fact, the first signs of the rejection of Keynesianism came from elements in Callaghan’s Labour
Government of the 1970s.  In response to yet another run on the pound, in 1976, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Dennis Healey, proposed radical reductions in public expenditure and the Prime
Minister told the Labour Party Conference, “You cannot spend your way out of recession”.
Subsequently, an abashed Government sought a loan from the IMF that came with further strings
attached in the form of cuts in public expenditure.  The contradictions of a Labour Government with
close ties to the trade union movement pursuing balanced budget policies that conflicted with union
aspirations finally brought the Government down in 1979.
Wars
7 caused governments to give a very high priority to maintaining full employment and this
strong aversion to allowing unemployment to rise tended to make wages one of the fixed points in
the system to which other variables adjusted.
8  In Hicks’ (1955) words, no longer was the British
economy on the Gold Standard but on a Labour Standard.
9  
With the aim of moderating wage increases without inducing a rise in unemployment,
governments invited unions into policy-making circles and encouraged them to participate in
programs aimed to restrict the growth of all types of money incomes.  These were largely fruitless
in that, after removing the effects of the business cycle, wage inflation tended to rise inexorably and
the unemployment rate seemed to rise along with it.  The form of this policy in the last Labour
Government of the 1970s, the so-called Social Contract, fell apart amid a wave of strikes in 1978-79.
But until Keynesian demand management policies were totally discarded in the1980s, the dominant
ideas in macroeconomic policy provided an environment that accorded unions an influential role in
the management of the economy.
10  
Hence, by the 1970s, it is difficult to make the case that unions in Britain enhanced
productivity or materially improved the distribution of income in society.  However, unions were6
11 For instance, in his research on productivity in manufacturing, Prais (1981) emphasized the
frequency of strikes in large plants: “Not only are more man-days lost per employee in Britain, but
there are added costs from the greater frequency of stoppages, verging in some plants on continuous
disruption; British management in large plants is not able to devote its main energies to the pursuit
of more efficient production methods, since so much time is taken up in ‘fire fighting’ to keep the
plant at work.....The present so-called ‘voluntary approach’ to industrial relations seems to have
been an important factor that has made large-scale production uncompetitive in this country” (pp.
262-3).
often a force for involving employees in shaping their work environment.  The scope of collective
bargaining had widened considerably beyond issues of wages and work hours.  Unions were
involved in issues of work assignment, the speed and organization of production, workplace health
and safety, and procedures for laying off of workers.  Indeed, these were often the very same issues
that gave rise to questions about the effects of unionism on productivity.  By involving themselves
in such matters, union representatives at the place of work gave employees a sense of participation.
The trouble is that, in some instances, this participation was accompanied with hostile and
obstructionist postures.  Furthermore, in pursuing their goals, unions became increasingly tolerant
of the costs imposed on the community in the form of highly disruptive strikes.  In this respect,
unionism in the 1970s tended to heighten antagonisms within society rather than act as a force for
civic engagement and cohesion.
Strikes
Because each country’s definition of disputes tends to differ, meaningful comparisons
of strike activity across countries are notoriously difficult to make.  However, taking the data at face
value, by international standards, British unions in the 1970s did not appear reluctant to invoke the
strike weapon.  In the seventeen countries listed in Table 1 for the 1970s, the United Kingdom ranks
in the top half of strike-prone economies.  1979 stands out as the particular “winter of discontent”
that presaged Margaret Thatcher’s electoral victory.  When the strikes were against monopolies, they
tended to impose considerable hardship on the community.  In addition, there was evidence to
suggest that the nature of these strikes damaged productivity.
11  
The vast majority of strikes were unofficial in that they occurred without following
specified procedures for settling disagreements.  Often, the national unions did not sanction them.
Indeed, in many instances, the national leadership might be quite surprised by them though, to grant
the strikes greater legitimacy and to exert some control over them, the national union would
sometimes declare the strikes “official” after they had begun.  7
12 The Donovan Commission, for example, declared, “We have no hesitation therefore in saying that
the prevalence of unofficial strikes, and their tendency (outside coalmining) to increase, have such
serious economic implications that measures to deal with them are urgently necessary” (United
Kingdom Royal Commission, 1968, p. 112). 
13 The 1975 Employment Protection Act gave the Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service
(ACAS) the task of resolving disputes over union recognition.  However, as ACAS was also given
the duty of “..... encouraging the extension of collective bargaining”, employers resistant to union
recognition saw ACAS not as a neutral arbiter, but as another arm of the union movement.  Because
employers were not compelled by law to cooperate with ACAS, ultimately its authority was eroded
and it became ineffectual.  See the description of its activities and a comparison with union
The key figures in these unofficial strikes were the union officials at the place of
work, the shop stewards.  To many workers, the shop steward was the human face of the union
movement while the national union leadership consisted of remote figures with little understanding
and knowledge of the particular issues at an employee’s place of work.  Unofficial strikes tended
to be short and they tended to be unpredictable except to some of those people at the place of work.
Some saw unofficial strikes as the assertion by workers of their control over their workplaces, a form
of syndicalism.  Official strikes tended to be national (rather than local), longer, and more
predictable.  It was often argued that it was the unpredictable nature of unofficial strikes that made
them more costly to employers than the more predictable official strikes and, therefore, the sort of
reforms most desirable were those that reduced the incidence of the unofficial strikes.
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A Voluntary System
According to the conventional account, British unionism flourished with little direct
statutory support.  Whereas many countries closely regulated and nurtured unionism by statutory
legislation, such direct support of collective bargaining was remarkably absent in Britain. What
distinguished Britain among industrialized countries by the 1970s was the degree to which unionism
evolved largely independent of direct regulation by the state.  There is nothing in Britain comparable
to America’s National and Labor Relations Act or Australia’s Conciliation and Arbitration Act, an
encompassing  piece of statutory legislation providing a definitive reference for the regulation of
unionism and collective bargaining.  
Illustrative of the prevailing attitudes toward unionism was the process by which
unions became recognized by employers.  Until the 1970s, there was no machinery to permit
workers to select union representation nor to require an employer to recognize a union of his
workers.
13  Indeed, “yellow dog” contracts, long outlawed in the United States, were not only legal8
recognition procedures in North America in Wood and Godard (1999).
14 A “yellow dog” contract is a document signed by a worker who, as a condition of employment,
promises not to join a union.  Examples of such contracts in Britain were provided by the Donovan
Commission (1968, pp. 54-5).
15 In its evidence to the Donovan Commission, the Trades Union Congress wrote colorfully: “It may
from some points of view be unfortunate that many employers only recognize the strength of trade
unionism when this strength is exercised overtly in the form of strike action, but it is undoubtedly
a fact that strike action to secure trade union recognition is by far the most successful method of
dragging such employers into the twentieth century and at the same time, through its stimulus to the
trade union recruitment, of exposing the oft-heard shibboleth that it is only a few troublemakers who
are claiming to represent the interests of the employees.  Strike action to force trade union
recognition is a good example of the principle that industrial peace is not the same thing as good
industrial relations.  Strike action to secure recognition is often the pre-condition for improving
industrial relations.”  (Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence (1968), p. 171.)
in Britain, but in some firms still invoked.
14  As a group strongly supporting collective bargaining,
the Donovan Commission deplored the lack of formal procedures to handle the issue of union
recognition and the disputes that sometimes resulted.
15  However, to an American audience familiar
with the formal procedures enshrined in the National Labor Relations Act to deal with union
recognition and representation, what is remarkable is the high union density achieved in Britain
without legalistic machinery designed to force unionism on reluctant employers.  
In the 1970s, the historical narrative of British unionism highlighted a relatively
modest piece of legislation, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.  This established that a union could not
be sued by an employer for damages resulting from a strike.  This “immunity” had been the practice
until 1901 when the House of Lords ruled otherwise in the Taff Vale case and the 1906 Act restored
the unions’ rights in law.  Prior to the 1980s, this Act giving a union “immunity” from litigation
stemming from costs imposed on an employer through a strike was often singled out as the most
important statute underpinning British unionism.  Though an important piece of legislation, the Act
is remarkable by international standards for what little it did.  For instance, unlike other countries’
major pieces of statutory law on collective bargaining, this Act did not precisely specify rules about
the formation of unions and the manner in which collective bargaining was to be conducted.  On the
contrary, up to the 1970s, Britain’s industrial relations are distinctive among wealthy economies for
the small role played by statutory legislation.  
The exceptions to this statement concern the years of and immediately following the9
two World Wars when the state played a much more intrusive role in collective bargaining and these
actions had lasting effects.  In addition, there was a period between 1971 and 1974 when an
Industrial Relations Act specified collective bargaining agreements to be legally enforceable
contracts unless the parties specified otherwise.  In fact, in these years, contracts routinely inserted
disclaimer clauses of the form “this is not a legally enforceable agreement.”  The Act was largely
inconsequential because it was boycotted by most unions and it was repealed by the Labour
Government in 1974.  With these important exceptions, private employers and unions in Britain
have usually found it in their interest to reach agreements without the law compelling them to do
so or how to go about it.  This is why it was often described as a “voluntary” system and it allowed
Henry Phelps Brown (1959, p.355) to write, “When British industrial relations are compared with
those of other democracies they stand out because they are so little regulated by law.”  
In Britain, there was no law obliging private employers to bargain with unions nor
anything making collective bargaining agreements enforceable in a court.  Unlike many other
countries, no statement in law exists that gives workers the right to strike.  Collective bargaining
agreements have an “untidy” appearance in that some cover all workers over the entire country in
a particular industry while others are restricted to a small group of workers within a particular plant.
Some unions represent workers in a large number of different industries while other unions organize
a small number of workers.  The law in Britain has taken the position that these issues are best
determined by the parties concerned with little need for state regulation.
Indirect Support of Collective Bargaining
This popular characterization of unionism in Britain before the 1980s is misleading.
First, in its capacity as an employer, the state championed collective bargaining and, given the
important role of the state as an employer by the 1970s, this implied that a large section of the
economy was covered by legislation promoting unionism.     Second, even in the private sector of
the economy, the state intruded to encourage unionism, but this intrusion was largely indirect.
Third, the Keynesian macroeconomic policies followed by successive governments in the 1960s and
1970s provided a hospitable climate for unionism.
First, consider the role of the state as an employer.  The support of collective
bargaining in public employment went back at least to the Whitley Committee Reports of the Great10
16 The outbreak and furtherance of the Great War gave a boost to the role of trade union leaders in
the administration of industry and government.  This helped to portray unions as responsible
organizations representing the legitimate interests of working people.  Simultaneously, tight labor
markets gave labor organizations at the factory floor the sort of muscle that was largely denied them
before the War.  To contain the shop stewards movement, Lloyd George’s Coalition Government
appointed in 1916 a committee under the chairmanship of J. H. Whitley, a Liberal M.P., to suggest
ways “for securing a permanent improvement in the relations between employers and employed”.
The reports of the Whitley committees encouraged the recognition by employers of unions and
proposed, in sectors where unions were well-established,  a hierarchical structure of employer-union
industrial councils designed to discuss and negotiate wages, work hours, and other aspects of
employment contracts.  The reports embraced public employment as well as private employment
and, though the government was initially resistant to accord unions rights of negotiation and
representation, soon government employees found themselves so represented.  
17 The House of Commons debated in 1923 a resolution stating “.....that local authorities, banks,
insurance and shipping companies, and other employers of professional and clerical workers should
follow the example of the Government in recognizing the organizations of these workers”.
Receiving broad support, the resolution passed without division on a free vote.
18 See Table II.1 of Daniel and Millward (1983).
War.
16  In the 1920s, while unionism was languishing in private industry, the notion that employees
of the state should be represented by unions was widely accepted.
17  The Second World War saw
similar pressures to those in the First War and, immediately after the War, the nationalization of
major industries resulted in the establishment of public corporations which were legally required to
recognize trade unions and to set up collective bargaining machinery.  The consequence was that
the employees of all public corporations were represented by unions and had their terms of
employment settled through collective bargaining.  By 1980, union density among full-time
employees of nationalized industries was 97 percent and that in public administration (principally,
local and central government) was 89 percent.
18  At that time, about 31 percent of workers were
employed in public administration or employed by public corporations, so a significant fraction of
all employees worked for an employer - the state - that expressly promoted collective bargaining for
its workers.
Furthermore, government encouraged private employers to recognize unions.  It did
so not by setting up procedures by which workers may determine whether they wanted union
representation.  On the contrary, as noted above, British law had been largely silent on the issue of
union recognition.  However, the law did specify consequences if an employer refused to recognize11
19 Otto Kahn-Freund regarded the 1946 Fair Wages Resolution as “one of the cornerstones of British
labour law” while Wedderburn described it as “at least a prop for the British structure of collective
bargaining” (Wedderburn (1986, pp.347-9).  (The 1946 Fair Wages Resolution was preceded by
analogous Resolutions in 1891 and 1909.)  The extension of collectively-bargained wages to
workers not covered by the collective agreements was effected by arbitration by the Ministry of
Labour between 1940 to 1959.  The same principle was enshrined in the Terms and Conditions of
Employment Act of 1959.  (See Royal Commission (1968), pp. 60-1.)  The Employment Protection
Act of 1975 set up the Central Arbitration Committee which had the power to oblige employers of
nonunion labor to observe those terms of employment obtaining in similar unionized activities or
in the same district.  This was rescinded in the 1980 Employment Act.  In September 1983, the Fair
Wages Resolution was annulled.
20 It is intriguing to note that, whereas in Britain agriculture was singled out early for statutory wage
regulation, in the United States it was singled out for exclusion from the Fair Labor Standards Act
in 1938.  The exclusion of farm workers from various pieces of New Deal legislation was engineered
in the U.S. Congress by Southern legislators who faithfully represented the interests of Southern
landowners.  See Alton and Ferrie (1999).
21 See Daniel and Millward (1983, p.179-80).  The authors maintain that these responses exaggerate
the extent of wage regulation by the Councils because “First,.....some managers erroneously took
negotiating bodies like Whitley Councils or joint industrial councils to be wages councils.....
a union.  This became explicit during the Second World War when the National Arbitration Tribunal
could impose on a non-union firm wages and working conditions that the Tribunal felt appropriate.
When presented with the possibility of having terms of employment imposed on them by the state,
many non-union employers felt it preferable to recognize a union and engage in collective
bargaining to ensure it had some role in determining its wages.  Such compulsory measures were
made less draconian in peacetime.  Nevertheless, by a series of Fair Wages Resolutions, those
private-sector employers with government contracts were obliged to pay their workers wages set by
collective bargaining in neighboring or comparable firms.
19  
Another mechanism bolstering collective bargaining in Britain was provided by
minimum wage regulation.  Unlike France and the United States where minimum wage laws
embrace almost all blue-collar workers, Britain’s minimum wage regulation had been selective.  For
instance, with legislation in 1917, agriculture was identified as an industry warranting wage floors
and other low wage sectors (such as retail trade and catering) were added subsequently by the
establishment of sector-specific Wages Councils.
20  By 1980, among employers outside of collective
bargaining, about one-third of managers claimed that the pay of their manual workers was set by
Wages Councils.
21  Such wage-setting machinery was regarded as inferior to collective bargaining12
Secondly,....some establishments that did not recognize unions adopted the rates specified by some
wages council......as the basis for their rates of pay, even though formally they were not bound by
those rates.”  In either event, through error or voluntary consent, a substantial number of non-union
employers set wages in relation to those specified by regulatory bodies.
22 The classic statement of these trends is, of course, found in Dicey (1914).
23 On rationalisation in the 1920s, see Robinson (1931) who defines it as the “semi-compulsory
reorganisation” of industry (Robinson, 1931, p.169).
and the expressed hope was that, in due course, the Wages Councils would be supplanted by union-
negotiated agreements. In practice, Wages Councils set wages with reference to those negotiated by
unions in neighboring industries.  The consequence was to extend union wage regulation to sectors
beyond those where unions were explicitly organized.
There were other ways in which government lent indirect support to unionism.  One
took the form of discouraging competition in product markets.  A monopolistic or oligopolistic firm
normally provides a much more hospitable environment for unions to survive and flourish than a
competitive firm so government may influence the extent and strength of unionism by its posture
toward product market competition.  
Though its origins can be traced to the nineteenth century,
22 the view that competitive
markets would produce the least objectionable outcomes for society became an increasingly
unfashionable doctrine in Britain as the twentieth century evolved.  Again, the Great War was a
catalyst in this development because the successful conduct of the War was seen to require a sudden
and extensive intrusion of the state in all kinds of activities.  When peace was restored, some looked
to restore a modest role for the state.  However, many others had become accustomed to an
interventionist state and they viewed the state as the primary vehicle for effecting change within
British industry which was diagnosed as too small and balkanized to compete effectively in
international markets with larger and more efficient American and German companies.  In the 1920s,
the “rationalisation” of British industry was the label given to mergers and takeovers that the state
expressly encouraged to create benefits of large economies of scale.
23  
In the inter-war period, the monopolization and oligopolization of industry occurred
with ownership remaining in private hands.  In the years after the Second World War, the same
process took the form of creating public monopolies covering large swathes of industry - electricity,
gas, coal, railways, urban transport, airlines, telecommunications, and (for many years) steel.  The13
24 As noted above, Edward’s Heath’s Conservative Government at the beginning of the 1970s took
a very different posture, but it was not acting with a mandate to make industrial relations more
legalistic.  Indeed, when asked in February 1974, “Who runs the country?”, the electorate did not
give Heath’s Government the ringing endorsement it was seeking.
25 Roy Adams (1993, p. 295) makes a similar argument:  “Despite the absence of extensive
legislation, the policy of British governments in the 20th century has not been neutral, as the policy
of voluntarism is sometimes interpreted to imply.  In fact, British policy has been to encourage
collective bargaining.  It has done so by notifying all public servants that collective bargaining is
the preferred means of establishing conditions of work, by requiring government suppliers to
recognize the freedom of their workers to join unions and engage in collective bargaining, and by
directly intervening in many disputes in order to pressure intransigent employers to recognize unions
dominant philosophy behind the “rationalisation” movement in the 1920s and the nationalization
movement after the Second World War was one of scepticism of the virtues of competition and
approval of large and monopolistic enterprises.
Labor unions firmly supported the nationalization of industry.  Some unionists
believed public ownership of industry would eliminate the adversarial nature of bargaining, but this
tenet was soon belied by highly contested disputes whether government was in the hands of the
Labour Party or the Conservative Party.  Public ownership tended to politicize collective bargaining
with government ministers entangled in disputes that were resolved often with little relation to the
financial performance of the industries.  Being monopolies, strikes in these nationalized industries
imposed heavy costs on consumers.  
Hence, in summary, collective bargaining in Britain by the end of the 1970s was
frequently described as a “voluntary” system because the law was largely silent on important issues
such as union recognition, the requirement to bargain, the  enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, the right to strike, and the structure of unionism.  The dominant attitude up to the end
of the 1970s was that these factors were best addressed by the parties concerned with little need for
state regulation.
24  However, this characterization is misleading in that, through a number of indirect
channels, government in Britain exercised a large influence on unionism and collective bargaining.
By its activities as an employer, by setting minimum wages in selected industries, by requiring
government contractors often to pay union-negotiated wages, and by discouraging product market
competition, the state played an important indirect role.  In these activities, the state encouraged
collective bargaining and helped to create the conditions in non-union labor markets and in product
markets that fostered unionism.
25  On top of this, as noted above, the macroeconomic policies14
and to negotiate with them”.
26 A discussion of these Gallup Poll responses from 1954 to 1985 is provided by Edwards and Bain
(1988) and Marsh (1990).
27 Along with the dominant view of the electorate, some employers felt workers were entitled to the
protections and representations of labor unions and, instead of fighting them, some employers
readily acceded rights of union representation to their workers.  This was by no means universal:
some employers (especially those operating in highly competitive product markets) stoutly resisted
union representation of their workers and actively opposed attempts to organize workers.
Nevertheless, in other instances, employers saw unions as the rightful agents of their employees’
concerns. 
followed by successive postwar British governments and especially the importance attached to the
goal of full employment provided the backdrop for unions to assume a conspicuous role in the
formation and execution of economic policy. 
In providing this indirect support for collective bargaining and unionism, the Labour
and Conservative governments from the Second World War to the 1970s were responding to the
dominant views in the country.  Until 1979, when asked “Generally speaking, do you think trade
unions are a good thing or a bad thing?”, the percentage responding “a good thing” always exceeded
the percentage responding “a bad thing.”  (See Figure 3.)  Only once, in fact, shortly after the
miners’ strike in 1974 was the percentage responding “a good thing” less than fifty percent.
26  The
state’s indirect support of collective bargaining, therefore, appeared to be more or less what the
electorate wanted.  This was not an instance where a small, yet influential, pressure group hijacks
government policy to further its own ends without the general public’s acquiescence.  On the
contrary, whatever doubts economists may have had about the beneficial effects of unionism, a
majority of the electorate had a benign and favorable view of unionism.
27  
In the almost forty years from the outbreak of the Second Word War to some point
in the 1970s, there was broad consensus regarding the appropriate posture toward unionism: there
should be a minimum of direct statutory promotion of unionism but considerable indirect support.
This view was explicitly challenged by Heath’s Conservative Government in the early 1970s and
issues concerning unionism figured prominently in the 1974 General Election campaign.   However,
the Government’s attempt to convert the system into something closer to the American legalistic
structure was not endorsed by the electorate.  At the same time, the Labour Party’s small margin of
victory in February 1974 was a signal that the broad consensus on unionism was breaking down.15
28 The U.S. question is, “Do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?”.  From 1936 to 1972, the
percentage responding “approve” was 60 or above.  Then, in the 1970s, a decline began that reached
a minimum of 55 percent in May 1979 and August 1981.  Since then, the approval percentage has
climbed to 65 percent in August 1999.  See Cornfield (1999).
III. The New Policy toward Unionism
The Change in Economic Policy
After a winter of extensive strikes in 1978-79, the general public tired of the
corporatist style of the Labour government in which labor union leaders sometimes seemed to
occupy a separate arm of government.  For the first time in its history, the Gallup Organization’s
question asking, “Generally speaking, do you think trade unions are a good thing or a bad thing?”
revealed in 1979 that an equal percentage of the British public replied “bad thing” as “good thing.”
See Figure 3.  Remarkably, the corresponding Gallup Poll in the United States also recorded a record
low “approval” percentage in the same year.
28
In 1979, an unhappy electorate voted in the most doctrinaire British government since
Atlee’s administration elected in 1945.  In contrast to Atlee’s government, Margaret Thatcher’s
government was committed to shrinking the public sector and emasculating corporatist institutions
such as labor unions.  Sure enough, the subsequent Conservative governments reduced the state’s
indirect support of unionism and collective bargaining by denationalizing a number of industries,
by eliminating minimum wage floors in specific industries, and by suspending the rules extending
union wage scales to nonunion employers.  
The ideas for reform came in part from the growing influence of laissez faire critics
who viewed the state of Britain’s labor markets as illustrative of the pervasive and suffocating role
of government on the economy.  Britain’s sluggish economic growth and the habitual tendency for
inflation to get out of control induced the search for more drastic policies.  The dominance of the
two party system in Britain meant that, by the late 1970s, the electorate looked to the opposition
party, the Conservative Party, for new ideas.  Within the Conservative Party, the middle-of-the road
policies associated with R. A. Butler and Harold Macmillan in the 1950s and 1960s had given way
to more radical ideas.  The key individual funneling laissez faire ideas from the right wing into the
Conservative Party in the late 1970s was Keith Joseph who, in turn, had the ear of the Party’s leader,16
29 The arguments of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman were widely disseminated.  Hayek in
BBC broadcasts in 1978 argued, “These legalised powers [from the 1906 Trade Disputes Act] of the
unions have become the biggest obstacle to raising the living standards of the working class as a
whole.  They are the chief cause of the unnecessarily big differences between the best- and worst-
paid workers.  They are the prime source of unemployment.  They are the main reason for the
decline of the British economy in general.”  (Reproduced in Hayek (1980, p.52).)
30 From Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool on 12
October 1979.  See Harris (1997).
Margaret Thatcher.
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Trade unions were one of the principal issues of the day so what was the new
Government’s posture on unions and collective bargaining?  Two key elements can be identified,
one concerning macroeconomic management of the economy and the other relating to productivity.
On macroeconomic policy, incomes policies and the bargains with unions to secure their cooperation
in wage restraint were to be a thing of the past.  The postwar Keynesianism that accorded full
employment a primacy of place in policy goals and that provided such a hospitable environment for
unionism was dropped.  The pursuit of price stability became the paramount goal and control over
the money supply was supposed to be the principal means.
On productivity and economic growth, by supporting a culture of restrictive work
practices (especially in public sector employment) and adversarial labor relations, unions (together
with unimaginative management and excessive government regulation) were blamed for Britain’s
poor performance.  The aspects of industrial relations marked for special attention were strikes, the
closed shop, and union governance.  Frequent strikes were viewed not only as inconveniencing the
community, but also as damaging productivity.  The closed shop was seen as making “.... it possible
for small groups to close down whole industries with which they have no direct connection.”
30  On
union governance, there was a belief that the union leadership tended to be more radical than the
rank-and-file so the Conservative Government proposed making unions more accountable to their
members.  In general, the goal of greater labor productivity required a shake-up of industrial
relations and the trimming of trade union entitlements.
Looking at subsequent events, some components of this program were certainly met:
the macroeconomic environment became much less amenable to unionism though price stability
proved to be elusive.  Labor union entitlements were clipped, industrial relations practices changed
substantially, closed shops became rare, union governance reformed, and strike activity fell sharply.17
31 To operate on expectations, a trajectory for monetary growth was declared.  The Minimum
Lending Rate rose to an unprecedented 17 percent in late 1979 and 1980.  In the second half of 1979,
the rate of change of average earnings increased from 10.1 percent to 18.8 percent and, as this was
accompanied by an appreciation in the sterling exchange rate, the impact on British competitiveness
in foreign markets was severe.  “The degree of overvaluation of sterling in the second half of 1980
was unprecedented in the post-war period and well in excess of the overvaluation resulting from the
return to the gold standard in 1925" (Dimsdale (19991, p. 133).  
Has this caused a higher growth in productivity?  This is less clear.  Let us consider these issues in
turn.  First, consider the changes in the macroeconomic environment and how legislation on strikes,
the closed shop, union governance, and indirect support for unionism changed after 1979.  The issue
of unionism and productivity merits special attention in the section that follows. 
The Macroeconomic Setting and Structural Changes in the Economy
The overriding goal of macroeconomic policy was to eradicate inflationary
tendencies from the economy, a goal shared by macroeconomic managers in some other countries.
The chosen mechanism was a gradual reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply coupled
with a reduction in the public sector borrowing requirement as a fraction of gross domestic
product.
31  The consequences for unemployment were tremendous as shown in Figure 4.  Compared
with its level over the forty years since the outbreak of the Second World War, unemployment has
remained high in the years after 1979 and it has only been in the late 1990s that unemployment rates
have reached levels comparable with the 1970s.  
Britain was by no means the only economy to experience a large rise in
unemployment in the 1980s, but the increase in Britain was larger than in most.  Figure 4 also shows
the unemployment rate in the U.K. relative to unemployment rates in the United States and France.
From the early 1980s, Britain’s unemployment rate has been consistently above that in the United
States.  The U.K. unemployment rate was also higher than France’s throughout the 1970s until 1987,
but since that time unemployment in the U.K. has fallen gradually to almost half that in France. 
It is customary to argue that an increase in unemployment signals a drop in
alternative employment opportunities and, consequently, a fall in labor’s bargaining power.  If
correct, the years of the 1980s until the mid-1990s are characterized by a chronic attenuation of
labor union bargaining  power.  Indeed, this loss may well have been enhanced by the fact that some
of the areas of union strength such as manufacturing and mining were especially hard hit both by
the recession and by the trimming of the budgets of nationalized industries and the transfer of some18
32 Similarly, if the broad industry structure in 1998 is applied to the union density by industry in
1979,  the larger part of the decline in unionism is left unaccounted for. The data for these analyses
are derived from Price and Bain (1983), the July 1980 issue of the Employment Gazette (for
employment figures in 1979), the June 2000 issue of Labour Market Trends (for employment figures
in 1998), and the July 200 issue of Labour Market Trends (for union density in 1999).  This analysis
is undertaken at the broad industry level (eleven industries identified) because more disaggregated
data appear not to be available.
33 This conclusion was reached also by Disney (1990) and Freeman and Pelletier (1990) for the years
of the first half of the 1980s.
34 As indicated in the footnote to Table 2, precise comparisons of union density across these years
are impossible because of differences in definitions of union membership and in employment.  This
table is useful, therefore, for broad trends only.
of their assets to the private sector.  This leads naturally to the question of whether the contraction
of unionism since 1979 in Britain is simply a reflection of changes in the structure of British industry
and, in particular, the consequence of the decline of employment in industries of union strength such
as manufacturing and mining and the growth of service employment, some of whose areas have been
difficult to organize.  Indeed, employment in manufacturing in 1998 was less than sixty percent of
its level in 1979 and coal mining employment constituted a trivial fraction of total employment.  
In fact, little of the decline in union membership density from 1979 to 1999 arises
from simple industrial changes.  If the industrial employment structure of 1979 is applied to the
union density by industry in 1999, the difference between actual union density in 1999 and that
implied by this experiment is only a few percentage points.
32  This is because many sectors of
traditional union strength had already contracted substantially by 1979 (thus coal mining
employment represented only one percent of total employment) while employment in other areas
of traditional union strength such as health services has expanded considerably.  Changes in
industrial structure are not a principal explanation for the decline in unionism over the twenty years
since 1979.
33
Other changes in the structure of unionism are suggested by the data in Table 2.
According to all of the categories of union density listed in this table, the record is one of union
decline - by gender, by broad occupation, by industry, by region, and by private-public ownership.
34
These are figures on union membership, but the message is the same if data on the coverage of
collective bargaining agreements are examined: in 1973, the wages of about 73% of employees were
covered by collective bargaining agreements; this fell to 70% in 1984, to 54% in 1990, and to 40%19
35 These figures are from Milner (1995) and Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, p. 197).  According
to Hicks (2000), in 1999, 17 percent of employees who were not members of union claimed their
pay and work conditions were covered by a union-negotiated agreement.  This implies that,
approximately, three million workers are “free riding” on union activities.
36 A conspicuous example was provided by the coal miners’ leader, Arthur Scargill. He refused to
hold a ballot before calling a momentous strike in 1984-85 and he managed to have himself elected
President of the union for life. 
in 1998.  In the private sector, the 1998 figure is 21 percent.
35  In other words, there has been a
steady erosion in the extent of unionism and in union-negotiated agreements in the economy.
Though there were some highly-publicized cases of de-recognition of unions, the principal factor
in this membership decline has been the failure of unions to gain recognition in newly formed
workplaces: the greatest declines in the extent of unionism are found in plants in private
manufacturing that have been established since 1980; by contrast, in the public sector, there is no
decline in union recognition in newly-established workplaces.  (See Disney, Gosling, and Machin
(1996), Machin (1999), and Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, pp.84-5).)
Given the critical role of management in determining whether to grant union
recognition, the failure of unions to gain a foothold in newly formed establishments is, in part, a
commentary on employers’ attitudes toward collective bargaining.  From 1979 until 1997,
successive Government ministers and “experts” attacked the notion that unionism enhances the
performance of the economy and, indeed, they replaced this with the idea that union leaders tend to
behave capriciously and without due reference to the wishes and interests of their members.
Certainly, some union leaders appeared to fit this profile well.
36  This campaign against collective
bargaining and the endorsement of the virtues of narrow self-interest have generated an environment
in which managements are less inclined to see unions as the legitimate representatives of the
interests of the workers.  Compared with the decades of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the new breed
of employers is less altruistic in their dealings with their own employees and this has manifested
itself in the view that unions are irrelevant or, worse, damaging to the enterprise.  A long and
sustained campaign would be required to change these attitudes among those who will be managers
in the next few decades. Legislation stipulating that, provided a workplace vote of employees so
determines, a union may be foisted onto a reluctant management may be the prelude to more
adversarial industrial relations and, ultimately, unsuccessful unionism.
Strikes20
37 After all, proponents of laissez faire sided with Dicey in describing the 1906 Act as conferring
“..... upon every trade union a privilege and protection not possessed by any other person or body
of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, throughout the United Kingdom.....It makes a trade
union a privileged body exempted from the ordinary law of the land.  No such privileged body has
ever before been deliberately created by an English Parliament” (Dicey, 1914, p. xivi).  Thatcher’s
government could have simply repealed the 1906 Act and allowed employers to take striking unions
to court.
38 In some respects, the British law came closer to that in the United States where secondary boycotts
and certain other types of strikes are illegal.  Also, a case law has built up in the U.S. over what
types of picketing are legal.  However, the balloting of workers to secure approval for a strike is not
the law in the U.S. even though many unions practice it.  Whereas in Britain the concern was that
union leaders tend to be more militant than the rank-and-file workers, in the U.S. the contract
rejection problem seemed to suggest that the union rank-and-file tended to be more militant that the
leadership.
39 Unfair dismissal law was introduced in 1971.  Before that date, employers had the authority to
dismiss any striking worker though such discharges were uncommon.  The 1974-79 Labour
government ruled that employers could dismiss striking workers and not be liable for damages for
The Thatcher administration’s posture toward strikes belied its laissez faire
proclivities.  This was because statutory law regulating strikes became more, not less, extensive
under her governments.  Really radical legislation would have been the repeal of the Trade Disputes
Act of 1906 which protected a union from being sued by an employer for damages resulting from
a strike.
37  What happened under the post-1979 Conservative governments was that unions’ legal
immunity from damages became more qualified: a union became liable for damages if striking
against a secondary employer; an employer could sue a union if the strike was not over industrial
relations issues that the employer could address, but over, say, political issues or inter-union feuds
that the employer had no control over; and a union would lose its immunity if the strike had
proceeded without first secretly balloting its members and obtaining the support of a majority for
strike action.  In 1993, unions were obliged to give seven days’ warning of a forthcoming strike.
Regulations on picketing became more stringent with the police granted more power to confine the
influence of pickets.  In those circumstances where the union lost its immunity, its financial
liabilities for damage were proscribed by law.  In instances where the union undertook strike action
without first balloting its members and ignored court injunctions to desist, the union’s funds can be
sequestered.
38 
Employers were granted more discretion over the dismissal of strikers.
39  Early in the21
violating the law on unfair dismissals provided all those striking were dismissed.  Dismissing some
workers and retaining others or re-hiring some workers and not hiring others rendered the employer
liable for damages.
40 Of course, the national union could declare the strike official, but if the necessary balloting had
not taken place this exposed the union to damage claims.
41 See Millward and Stevens (1986, Table 10.1) and Cully at al. (1999, Figure 6.4).  It is revealing
that, in 1986, Millward and Stevens devote an entire chapter of over thirty pages to “industrial
action” while, in 1999, Cully et al. allocate a little over a page to the topic.
1980s, employers had the authority to re-engage strikers selectively after a certain time had passed
while, in 1990, employers could dismiss striking workers selectively if the union had not authorized
the strike.  Given the tendency for strikes to be unofficial, these seemingly-small modifications in
the law sapped the shop stewards’ bargaining power.
40  
The number and importance of strikes in Britain have fallen considerably.  See Figure
2.  Whereas in 1980 some 22 percent of establishments reported some sort of “industrial action”
during the previous twelve months, in 1998 the corresponding figure was 2 percent.
41  To what
extent can this decline in disputes be attributed to the legal changes in the 1980s and 1990s?  Strike
activity has fallen in most countries though more in Britain than elsewhere.  The last column of
Table 3 shows annual working days lost through strikes per thousand employees in the years 1994-
98 as a fraction of those in 1976-80.  This ratio is consistently less than unity, but its lowest value
is for Britain: in the period from 1994-98, annual working days lost per employee in Britain were
merely four percent of their level in 1976-80!
There are many competing explanations for this change so it is difficult to determine
the particular contribution of the law.  Even if the power of unions were throttled, it always takes
two parties to strike so an explanation may focus as much on the enhanced opportunity of
management to wage a profitable strike as on the reduced power of unions to conduct a successful
strike.  Current modelling of disputes would suggest that they are the consequence of information
asymmetrically shared between the union and management.  Did the Conservative Governments’
legislation alter the allotment of information and, in this way, did it result in fewer disputes?
It is plausible that the mandatory balloting of workers before strikes provides
information to both management and the union about the workers’ resolve if a strike does occur -
provided those voting reveal their propensities accurately.  In an analysis of the impact of balloting22
42 In the United States, the closed shop corresponds to the British pre-entry closed shop while the
union shop is what in Britain goes by the name of the post-entry closed shop.  The Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947 made the closed shop illegal in the United States in inter-state commerce while states with
“right-to-work” laws prohibit the union shop.   
procedures, Undy, Fosh, Morris, Smith, and Martin (1996) argue that these procedures had a small
effect on the course of strike activity.  However, they did find that “.... balloting provided a
comparatively low-cost and credible way of demonstrating the resolve of union members without
calling on them to engage in strike action” (p. 230) and, in this sense, the legislation contributed to
alleviating the informational asymmetry between management and unions and helped to reduce
strikes.  Undy et al. also conclude that “.....the threat, and demonstration of the damaging financial
effects, of legal actions by employers made many union negotiators more cautious and risk-averse
in their dealings with employers during disputes” (p. 230).  On balance, this balloting legislation
helped reduce strike activity although it is unlikely to have  been a principal factor.
Of course, the vast majority of strikes occur at unionized establishments so, insofar
as the legislation clipped the reach of unionism, the government’s agenda can be said to have caused
a decline in strike activity.
Closed Shops
The Conservative Governments directed several pieces of legislation to the closed
shop.  In 1974, the Labour Government established that an employer could not legally use union
membership as a criterion for firing a worker.  However, it was permissible to fire an employee if
he or she refused to join a closed shop.  In 1988, dismissal because of either union membership or
non-membership was determined unfair and, in this respect, an equivalence between members and
non-members was resolved.  Because non-members could not be fired, this dealt a blow to the post-
entry closed shop. In 1990, the law turned from dismissal to hiring: employers could not refuse to
hire workers based on their union membership status.  This undercut the pre-entry closed shop.
42 
This legislation has contributed to the virtual elimination of the closed shop.  In 1980,
some workers were covered by a closed shop in 23 percent of workplaces.  This number was as high
as 88 percent in the nationalised industries.  In 1998, according to the responses of managers, merely
2 percent of workplaces were identified where employees had to be union members to retain their23
43 The 1980 figures are taken from Millward and Stevens (1986) Table 4.3 and describe workplaces
with at least 25 employees.  The 1998 figure is from Cully et al. (1999), p. 89 and describes
workplaces with at least ten employees.  Whereas in Millward and Stevens the closed shop merits
a 17 page chapter, in Cully et al. the closed shop receives a couple of paragraphs.
44 See Stewart (1987, 1995) and Metcalf and Stewart (1992).
45 It was sometimes argued that management used the closed shop to discourage the formation of
more unions and to help enforce discipline in environments with a propensity toward anarchy.
jobs.
43  In some respects, the closed shop has gone underground in that sometimes employers
(especially in the public sector) “strongly recommend membership.”  Nevertheless, the attack on the
closed shop has been largely won.  
There are two questions.  The first is whether this victory over the closed shop may
be attributed to the legislation alone.  This is doubtful.  The pre-entry closed shop was most
extensive in old craft-related activities that have been heavily affected by technological change -
newspapers, printing, shipping, and docks - and it is probable that many closed shops would have
been swept aside anyway by the onslaught of the new technology.
The second question is whether this victory over the closed shop is an important one.
There is no doubt that the closed shop was correlated with a number of outcomes: for instance, in
1980 and 1984, the union-nonunion wage differential tended to be greater when the unionized
establishment had a pre-entry closed shop.
44  However, the unresolved question is whether this was
the consequence of the closed shop or the consequence of something else that produced also the
closed shop.  Indeed, this problem frustrates the interpretation of many correlations between
variables in industrial relations where cause and effect are especially hard to disentangle.  According
to this alternative hypothesis, the closed shop is as much an outcome variable as wages or work
hours so the closed shop should be seen as an indicator of union influence or as a signal of
managerial preferences,
45 not their cause. 
Union Governance
Laws were introduced strengthening the rights of rank-and-file union members in
dealing with their own organization.  It was stipulated that direct, secret, elections of union officials
must occur within every five years while, every ten years, ballots must be held to approve any
political expenditures the union makes.  Union members were given rights to examine their union’s
accounting records.  A worker was required to provide prior written consent to an employer who24
46 It needs emphasizing that not only has union membership as a fraction of employment dropped,
but the absolute level of union membership has fallen considerably.  According to data published
in the Employment Gazette and reported to the Certification Officer, union membership at the end
of 1979 was 13,289 thousand whereas at the end of 1998 it was 7,807 thousand, over a forty percent
drop.  There is a large literature devoted to accounting for movements over time in union
membership and density.  For example, by constructing their own indicator of the legal climate of
collective bargaining and by drawing inferences from the differences between union density in
Britain and that in Ireland, Freeman and Pelletier (1990) ascribe most of the decline in density in
Britain in the 1980s to the less supportive legal environment for collective bargaining.  See Metcalf
(1991) for a brief critical review of the research on union density in Britain.
automatically deducts union dues from the worker’s pay check.  This consent needed to be renewed
every three years.  This prompted the unions to wage a campaign to encourage workers to approve
automatic check-off and to encourage employers to support the practice.  By 1998, some two-thirds
of unionized establishments practiced the check-off (Cully et al.(1999) p. 89).  In that year, the
Labour Government repealed the requirement for written approval of the check-off.
The drop in union membership,
46 the penalties incurred by some unions for illegal
actions, and the effect of various measures (such as balloting before taking strike action) to make
the union leadership more accountable to its rank-and-file left the finances of the unions in a more
precarious state by the late-1990s than for many decades.  Though many unions operate more
efficiently than they have ever done and increasingly have the appearance of friendly societies (just
as they did in the nineteenth century when they provided a whole array of cash payments to cover
untoward events such as accidents, illness, and retirement), their resources to support their members
in lengthy strikes have been severely attenuated.
Indirect Effects on Collective Bargaining and Unionism
In describing the state of labor markets before the accession to power of a series of
Conservative Governments, I argued that, through a number of indirect measures, the state provided
widespread support of unionism and collective bargaining.  These indirect measures included the
role of the state as an employer, the practice of setting minimum wages in certain industries, the
requirement that government contractors pay union-negotiated wages, and the impediments to
product market competition.  The Conservative Governments explicitly addressed all these indirect
measures.
Public sector finances were placed under stringent constraints and pay negotiations
were governed less by notions of “comparability” with private sector wages and more by whether25
47 In 1984, of all workplaces where collective bargaining was the dominant form of pay setting, 69
percent of them were multi-employer agreements.  By 1998, this had fallen to 46 percent.  Among
all workplaces in 1998, just 13 percent had wages determined by multi-employer agreements and
6 percent in private sector manufacturing.  See Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, pp. 186-8).
48 See MacGregor (1999), Table C.
pay levels were generating adequate supplies of labor.  Where possible, collective bargaining was
decentralized.  Indeed, one of the most important changes in bargaining since 1979 has been the
notable decrease in multi-employer agreements.
47  Such decentralized agreements tend to be more
sensitive to the particular circumstances of the employer and the plant.  
By denationalizing (or “privatizing”)  large parts of the public sector, the state
became a less far-reaching employer.  In 1978, public sector employees represented 31 percent of
all employees.  Twenty years later, the number had fallen to 20 percent.
48  The policy was designed
also to encourage competition in product markets.  However, privatizing industries is not the same
as ensuring a competitive environment and, in many cases, the issue became one of choosing
between a private monopoly and a public monopoly.  Strikes against private monopolies have the
same opportunity for imposing costs on consumers as strikes against public monopolies.  Moreover,
a number of these industries are still in the state’s hands so the unions in these sectors retain
considerable leverage.  Yet, the public sector itself was obliged to be more sensitive to its costs: in
the 1970s most local and central government services were delivered by unionized, state employees;
in the 1980s and 1990s, by “contracting out” these services to (often non-union) private firms,
competitive pressures were injected into union-supplied activities.
The practice of setting minimum wages in certain industries was attacked by
eliminating Wages Councils while the requirement that government contractors pay union-
negotiated wages was eliminated by repealing the Fair Wages Resolution in 1983.  More generally,
statutory rules guided wage determination much less and firm- or plant-specific factors have directed
earnings changes.  Performance-related pay mechanisms have gained in popularity and earnings
structures simplified.  The consequence has been for real wages to rise throughout the earnings
distribution, but high-paid workers have seen their wages increase much faster than the low-paid.
(See OECD (1996) and Schmitt (1995).)  More generally, notwithstanding the introduction of a new
National Minimum Wage in 1999,  the relatively narrow wage differentials characteristic of
corporatist economies are not an appropriate description of British labor markets in 2000.  26
49 This form of productivity effect of unionism accords well with the stories about the inefficient use
of workers in British industry entertainingly illustrated by Fred Kite’s union in  “I’m All Right
Jack.”  If the bargaining power of the union over employment is reduced, then employment will fall
and output per worker will rise. This is a once-and-for-all increase in labor productivity, not a
IV. Unionism and Productivity
The Contribution to Changes in Productivity
The relationship between productivity (measured in different ways) and unionism has
been the subject of a good deal of research.  The basic reason why this has been difficult to unravel
is that, even if production functions were identical in unionized and non-unionized workplaces,
productivity differences will emerge between the two classes of firms insofar as collective
bargaining affects wages.  If wages are higher in the unionized firm, if the firm may freely adjust
inputs in response to these price differences, and if the firm does not throw resources away,
employment will tend to fall and labor productivity will be higher in the union firm.  Ideally the
researcher would like to present the unionized and nonunion firms with various combinations of the
same inputs and then observe their outputs.  In fact, the researcher does not select the inputs; the
firms select the inputs and this selection is made in response to input prices.   
In addition to the wage effects of collective bargaining, unionism has non-wage
effects on a firm’s operations which imply that, even when management is free to make decisions
about the use of labor, the unionized firm’s labor productivity will differ from that of the non-union
firm.  For instance, some have suggested that, with an agent - the union - to protect their interests,
workers will tend to be more cooperative and forthcoming in unionized workplaces, that unionism
involves participation and participation begets higher productivity.  Conversely, unionism may
protect slothful working habits and defend malfeasance which lower labor productivity.  As most
scholars have recognized, a priori arguments cannot settle whether, on balance, this effect works to
raise or lower productivity in union workplaces.
The previous two arguments assume labor input choices are made unilaterally by
management.  There is a third effect of unionism on productivity insofar as unions do not grant
management a free hand in labor input decisions.  Either through explicit bargaining over the level
of labor input or implicitly through resisting organizational changes that raise productivity, labor
input in unionized establishments may exceed the levels otherwise implied by the wages and
technical efficiency of the labor force.
49  In fact, when the subject of unionism and productivity was27
permanent increase in the rate of growth of productivity.
50 Another awkward measurement issue arises out of the fact that a number of studies use some
measure of the value of output in the definition of productivity: if unionism has effects on input
prices, these will normally be transmitted to output prices ensuring, by construction, some positive
correlation between this indicator of productivity and unionism.
51 Of course, the popular view of the Luddites is also wanting.  See Hobsbawm (1964).
posed in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, it was this third class of arguments that tended to find most
frequent expression. 
Other routes by which unionism may affect productivity have been conjectured.  For
instance, the fear that a union may capture the rents from investment in physical plant and equipment
may discourage management from undertaking such investments.  (Grout (1984).)  This implies
lower capital stock in unionized plants.  The impact on productivity is less clear.  With lower capital,
output will be lower and, if output per worker is a positive function of the level of physical capital,
then labor productivity will be lower.  But whether output per factor input (total factor productivity)
will be lower is less obvious. Indeed, in the simplest of cases, in this situation, total factor
productivity is likely to be greater in the unionized plant. This illustrates that the impacts of
unionism on productivity and on productivity growth are far from obvious and they are likely to
depend on prosaic issues of variable definition and measurement (such as whether labor productivity
or total factor productivity is being measured).
50  
Productivity in unionized establishments will compare unfavorably with that in non-
union establishments insofar as unions are effective in discouraging the introduction of new
production technologies into workplaces.  However, the examination of the responses to questions
in the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys about technological change does not support
the popular view of British unions as twentieth century Luddites.
51  Thus, Daniel (1987) finds that
trade union resistance to technical change is very much the exception.  Shop stewards tend to be
more supportive of the introduction of advanced technology than the workers who, in turn, are
generally favorably disposed.  There were exceptions to this finding.  Most noticeably, the
nationalised industries constituted an important pocket of resistance to technical change.  However,
in general, unions much more frequently supported, not opposed, such change.
The weight of the evidence seems to suggest the following assessment: up to the early
1980s, unionism was associated with lower labor productivity, but, in the 1980s, this gap was28
52 This assessment conforms to Metcalf’s (1989, 1990) very informed statement of our knowledge
by the end of the 1980s.  Also see Booth’s (1995) review.
53 An example of a study supporting this conclusion is Gregg, Machin, and Metcalf’s (1993) who
show that, in a sample of 328 private companies in the late 1980s, real sales growth was greater in
those firms employing workers where some union-de-recognition had occurred.  Also included in
the specification is a variable measuring increased foreign competition although the presence of
unionism in this equation implies that the coefficient on increased competition measures the effect
of competition on real sales growth holding unionism constant.  In fact, increased foreign
competition may have been the spur to de-recognize the union in which case the full effects of
competition involve consideration of the unionism variables, too.  In this study, unionism and the
change in union status are treated as predetermined.
narrowed because the highly unionized sector tended to exhibit faster productivity growth.
52  The
causes of this faster growth are difficult to identify, but most frequently mentioned are the combined
consequences of a more competitive product market environment and the Conservative
Government’s labor relations legislation.
53  This raises the distinction between the effects of
unionism on the level of productivity and the effects of unionism on the rate of growth of
productivity.  Some authors have gone so far as to suggest that a lower level of union density will
result in a permanently higher growth in productivity.  
This is exactly the position taken by Bean and Crafts (1996) who argue that “the
changed industrial relations scene of the recent past has not only allowed a once-and-for-all
productivity gain, but also improved future growth potential” (1996, p. 161).  What aspects of this
“changed industrial relations scene” have contributed to these permanent productivity gains?  The
legislation against closed shops is unlikely to have been profound because closed shops are more
a symptom than a source of union strength.  Similarly, legislation making unions more accountable
to their own members is unlikely to have enhanced workplace productivity. 
Bean and Crafts (1996) suspect that the decline in multi-unionism (that is, the
presence of more than one union at a workplace) was the foremost labor market feature raising
Britain’s productivity growth.  The key piece of evidence they offer for this is a regression fitted to
a pooled data set of about 137 three-digit industries (predominantly manufacturing) and eight sub-
periods from 1954-58 to 1982-86.  The dependent variable is the annual growth in total factor
productivity.  However, there is no time series information on their key variable, the fraction of
workplaces in which there is more than one manual union, so the 1980 cross-section variation in this
variable is assumed to take on the same values over three decades.  This is quite heroic: there were29
54 A part of their argument involves the use of what they call a “multiple union dummy” that prior
to 1979 takes the value of zero and from 1979 equals the value of the fraction of workplaces with
more than one union.  This allows for the effect of multiple unionism to differ in the 1979-82 and
1982-86 sub-periods from that in earlier periods.  The coefficient estimated on this variable is
positive from which they infer that the damaging effects of multiple unions was less in the early
1980s.  Because the extent of multiple unionism barely changed in the early 1980s (see Millward
and Stevens (1986), p. 73), something happened in the early 1980s to ameliorate the impact of
multiple unionism.  This “something” would seem to be the variable we seek rather than multiple
unionism itself.
55 In related work, Machin and Stewart (1990, 1996) report that in 1980, 1984, and 1990, financial
performance is lower in unionized establishments although much of this takes the form of unions
capturing product market rents.
over 700 unions in 1954, the beginning year of their estimating period, and about 400 in the early
1980s, the end of their period of study.  The assumption that the incidence of multi-unionism is a
constant also prevents them from allowing for permanent unobserved differences among these
industries.
54  This specification constitutes a weak reed for any reliable inferences about the impact
of multiple unionism on the growth in productivity.  
Nevertheless, the issue of multi-unionism recurs in evaluations of industrial relations
practices.  For instance, using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Machin, Stewart,
and Van Reenan (1993) exploit information on responses by managers who assess their
establishment’s financial performance compared with other establishments in the same industry.
They find that, where management bargain separately with each of the unions - a so-called
“fragmented bargaining structure” - the firm’s financial performance suffers.  They suggest that
where the unions form a single bargaining committee and management bargains with this committee
“around a single table,” unfavorable outcomes are not apparent.  In other words, where management
insist on the unions joining together for purposes of bargaining with them, there are no untoward
effects of multi-unionism on pay, financial performance, and strikes.
55  
The history of unionism in Britain abounds with instances in which groups of workers
seek to preserve their identity in separate organizations and find it more effective to pursue their
aspirations in their distinct associations.  This evidence suggests such multi-unionism does not
damage the financial performance of firms provided the unions band together for the purposes of
collective bargaining with management.  In creating an environment in which managements had
greater authority to insist upon the elimination of fragmented bargaining structures, public policy30
56 There are two other categories - “no comparison possible” and “relevant data not available” - but
few observations are in these categories and they will not be used.  Most of these workplaces are in
public administration, health, and education.  
in the 1980s and 1990s made British industrial relations less of a drag on economic growth or so
some observers would have it.
Labor Productivity, Financial Performance, and Unionism in 1998
What is the most recent evidence of the effects of multi-unionism and fragmented
bargaining and, after all this remarkable retreat in unionism, what is left of the association between
productivity and unionism?  To address this, I turned to the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations
Survey (WERS) and examined the responses concerning financial performance and labor
productivity.  In this Survey, a representative from management was told, “I now want to ask you
how your workplace is currently performing compared with other establishments in the same
industry.  How would you assess your workplace’s financial performance/labor productivity?”  The
following five categories of responses were used in the subsequent analysis: “a lot below average”;
“below average”; “about average for the industry”; “better than average”; and “a lot better than
average”.
56
There are some obvious shortcomings in assessing an organization’s financial
performance and productivity on the basis of management’s perceptions.  How well-informed is he
of his competitors’ performance and how much wishful thinking goes into his responses?  However,
there are also severe shortcomings in conventional measures of performance and productivity.
When firms produce different goods and employ different types of labor, the configuration of output
per labor input across firms must use some price indices to put diverse outputs on a common footing
and the quantity of worker-hours ought to be adjusted in some way for skill differences in labor.
Most workers are now employed in the service sector where the measurement of output is fraught
with special problems.  
Similar concerns arise in conventional measures of financial performance.  Even
when available (and frequently it is not), accounting profits does not map precisely into the
organization’s rate of return and, when a workplace is part of a larger organization, its “profits” are
not only not defined, they are also secondary to the organization’s “bottom line”.  This does not
mean that the answers of a manager to these questions provide ideal indicators of a workplace’s
productivity and performance.  The argument is simply that they contain information that may well31
57 “.....[A] quarter of workplaces did not operate in the trading sector, and for these notions of profit
and loss simply do not apply.  Similarly, the concept of labour productivity has meaning in all
workplaces, but there are no standardised measures in many sectors.  For example, there are no
conventional measures of value-added which would allow a comparison of the labour productivity
of a hospital against a school” (Cully, Woodland, O’Reilly, and Dix (1999), p.120).
58 The calculated P
2 statistic is 622 with 16 degrees of freedom.  
be useful in drawing inferences about a workplace’s effectiveness.
57  Indeed, management’s
assessments may well embody qualitative considerations that conventional measures of productivity
and financial performance have difficulty in recognizing.  In fact, Machin and Stewart (1996) report
that the less favorable the managers’ assessments of their financial performance in the 1984 WIR
Survey, the greater the probability of the workplace having closed down by 1990.
For the investigation in this paper, workplaces were discarded if they had missing
values on any variables used in the analysis below and this left 1,484 workplace observations from
the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey to investigate.  The distribution of responses on
labour productivity cross-classified by responses on financial performance are provided in Table 4.
Evidently, most managers like to think that their workplaces are either average or better than
average.  There is a clear positive correlation between the responses on labour productivity and those
on financial performance: the null hypothesis of no association between the two responses is rejected
on a chi-square test at a very high level of significance.
58  
Workplaces are divided into four categories based on their union and bargaining
status: nonunion workplaces; workplaces with a single union; workplaces with many unions but with
joint bargaining; and workplaces with many unions engaging in separate bargaining.  In the 1998
Survey, of the 1,484 workplaces, 597 are nonunion, 322 are single union workplaces, 337 are
workplaces with many unions engaging in joint bargaining, and 228 are workplaces with many
unions engaging in separate bargaining.  The distribution of responses on labor productivity by type
of workplace is given in Figure 5 and those on financial performance in Figure 6.  The proportion
of managers in nonunion workplaces who assess their workplace to be “a lot better than average”
is greater in the nonunion sector, but this is offset, at least in part, by their lower frequency of
assessing their workplace as simply “better than average”.  If the percentage of responses of “a lot
better than average” and those of “better than average” are aggregated, the distribution of responses
across the four types of workplaces are as follows:32
59 For the estimates of the " parameters in Table 5, the Xi variables consist of the fraction of
employees who are part-time, the fraction of employees who are women, six dichotomous variables
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The workplaces with the least favorable aggregate responses are those where many unions operate
and bargain separately with management.  This general theme will recur.
To determine whether union-nonunion differences in labor productivity and financial
performance are contained in these data and whether differences exist by bargaining structure,
suppose Bi is a latent measure of labor productivity or of financial performance in workplace i.
Initially, posit that Bi is a linear function of whether the workplace is unionised (Ui) and of other
variables Xi, and of unmeasured factors, ei, that include the characteristics of the respondent:
(1) Bi = " Ui + $ Xi + ei ,
where ei is assumed to be distributed normally with zero mean and unit variance.  This standardized
normal assumption will permit the estimation of an ordered probit model.  Although Bi is
unobserved, the categorical responses to the questions do provide information on this latent variable.
These categorical responses are denoted by pi where we adopt the convention that  pi = 1 for
workplaces designated to be a lot below average, pi = 2 for those reported as below average, pi = 3
for those described as average, pi = 4 for workplaces better than average, and pi  = 5 for those
characterized as a lot better than average.  The relation between the observed variable pi and the
unobserved variable Bi is given as follows:
pi = 1 if Bi # m1 
pi = j if m j-1 < Bi # m j ,    j = 2, 3, 4 
pi = 5 if m 4 # Bi ,
where the censoring parameters, the m’s, are to be estimated jointly with " and $.  The maximum
likelihood estimation of equation (1) yields estimates of the coefficient on Ui given in columns (a)
and (b) of line 1 in Table 5.
59  By conventional statistical criteria, the null hypothesis of no33
of workplace size, and six dichotomous variables indicating how long the workplace has been at the
present location.  Workplace size and years of operation seem necessary control variables in a study
of productivity.  A number of other specifications were applied with small changes in general
inferences.  The Ui variable takes the value of unity if any of the workplace’s  employees belong to
a union.  For all the equations whose results are reported, likelihood ratio tests suggest a statistically
significant relationship between, in turn, the productivity and performance indicators and the set of
right-hand side variables. 
60 The union-nonunion differences and the separate-joint bargaining differences are evaluated at the
mean values of all the other variables.
association between these indicators of labor productivity and the incidence of unionism cannot be
rejected. However, this is not the case for the measures of financial performance where the presence
of unionism is associated with lower financial returns.  
The implications of these estimates are provided in Table 6 where column (a) lists
union-nonunion differences in labor productivity and column (b) lists union-nonunion differences
in financial performance as implied by the estimates in line 1 of Table 5.
60  Union-nonunion
differences in labor productivity are trivial.  Those in financial performance suggest that union
workplaces are 3 percent less likely to be a lot better than average and 2 percent less likely to be
better than average compared with nonunion workplaces.  The superior performance of nonunion
workplaces in financial performance is compatible with a rent-reallocation view of unions according
to which unions appropriate some of an organization’s rents.  
To determine whether the bargaining structure plays a role in this, consider specifying
union’s impact in equation (1) in the following manner: " = "0 + "1.Mi + "2.Si.  Here Mi is a
dichotomous variable taking the value of unity in those workplaces where more than one union
operates, but where these unions collaborate as far as collective bargaining is concerned.  Such
workplaces are characterized by joint bargaining.  Si is a dichotomous variable taking the value of
unity for those workplaces with many unions and with separate (or “fragmented”) bargaining.
Substituting this expression for " in equation (1) yields the following estimating equation:
(2)  Bi = "0 Ui  + "1 Ui Mi +"2 Ui.Si + $ Xi + ei ,
where "0 denotes any effect on Bi of a single union workplace, "0 + "1 of a multiple union
workplace where the unions bargain jointly, and "0 + "2 of a multiple union workplace where the
unions bargain separately.  The ordered probit estimates of the " coefficients of this equation are
contained in lines 2, 3, and 4 of columns (a) and (b) of Table 5.  By conventional criteria, the34
estimates of the coefficients of "0 and "1 would not be judged as significantly different from zero.
However, the estimate of "2 would be judged as significantly less than zero both for the labor
productivity equation and for the financial performance equation.  The implications of these
estimates of "2 are contained in columns (c) and (d) of Table 6 which reports the difference between
two multiple-union workplaces, one where unions bargain separately and one where the unions
bargain jointly.  For labor productivity, workplaces with fragmented bargaining have a 4 percent
lower probability of being a lot better than average and a 4 percent lower probability of being better
than average compared with a workplace where the unions bargain jointly.  Similarly, in terms of
financial performance, when bargaining is fragmented, the workplace is 6 percent less likely to be
a lot better than average and is 5 percent less likely to be better than average compared with a
workplace with joint bargaining.  These results are consistent with the view that, if a union-nonunion
difference obtains, it is the bargaining structure that accounts for this difference with fragmented
workplaces reporting relatively lower productivity and lower financial performance than multiple
union workplaces where bargaining is joint.  
Finally, consider fitting equation (2) to the 887 unionized workplaces only (so for all
observations Ui = 1):
(3)  Bi = "1 Mi +"2 Si + $ Xi + ei .
The ordered probit estimates of the " coefficients of equation (3) are given in columns (a) and (b)
of lines 5 and 6 in Table 5 and again the suggestion is that what matters for labor productivity and
financial outcomes is not multi-unionism per se, but whether bargaining is joint or fragmented.  The
implications of these estimates are contained in columns (e) and (f) of Table 6 where, among multi-
union workplaces, those where fragmented bargaining take place are 3 percent less likely to have
labor productivity a lot better than average and 5 percent less likely to have labor productivity better
than average compared with those workplaces with joint bargaining.  Similarly, on financial
performance, workplaces with fragmented bargaining score 5 percent lower on the probability of
being a lot better than average and 5 percent lower on the probability of being better than average
compared with workplaces with joint bargaining.
These results are compatible with the following interpretation.  On average, by the
late 1990s, unionism per se has negligible effects on productivity; the state of labor relations is the
key variable associated with productivity; and, in Britain, workplaces with fragmented bargaining
are associated with poorer productivity.  With respect to financial performance, unions tend to
reallocate an organization’s rents toward workers and, in Britain, this occurs more substantially in35
61  Regrettably, by trying to fit the very same equation and dropping observations on workplaces if
a missing value is encountered on any one variable, we arrive at a much smaller number of
establishments: 380 workplaces.  Of these, 66 consist of nonunion workplaces, 139 are single union
workplaces, 20 are workplaces with many unions but with joint bargaining, and 155 are workplaces
with many unions and fragmented bargaining.  (Note that, in the 1990 Survey, 11 of the single union
workplaces were said to have more than one bargaining unit.  For our analysis, we assumed that such
multi-unit bargaining by a single union may be interpreted as joint bargaining although, in principle,
this is something that could be tested.)  As in the 1998 Survey, the responses on labour productivity
and those on financial performance are strongly positively correlated on a conventional chi-square
test.  The cross-classification of workplaces by labour productivity and financial performance in
1990 is given in Table 7.
fragmented bargaining workplaces.  
Having arrived at these findings from the 1998 WER Survey, I went back to the 1990
WIR Survey to determine whether similar patterns are evident in this establishment survey, too.
Trying to fit the very same equations to the 1990 data as already estimated to the 1998 data, the
results are given in columns (c) and (d) of Table 5 with inferences regarding the probability
distributions in the bottom panel of Table 6.
61   The results are broadly similar to those for 1998
although there are a few interesting differences. According to column (c) of line 1 in Table 5, in
1990 unionised workplaces have significantly lower labour productivity than non-unionised
workplaces.  Thus, as reported in column (a) in the lower panel of Table C, unionised workplaces
have a 6 percent lower probability of being classified as “better than average” and a 9 percent lower
probability of being classified as “a lot better than average” compared with non-unionised
workplaces.  It appears again as if it is workplaces with fragmented bargaining where this
differential is concentrated.  This is suggested by the estimates in lines 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5 and
the probability differences in column (c) in the lower panel of Table 6.
With respect to financial performance, there is again the suggestion that workplaces
with fragmented bargaining tend to report lower financial performance compared with workplaces
with joint bargaining.  However, this is less evident than it was in the 1998 data.  The point estimates
in column (d) of Table 5 are not much greater than their estimated standard errors.  The implications
of these point estimates for the probability distributions (Table 6) suggest that meaningful
differences occur only for the probability of being “a lot better than average” where workplaces with
fragmented bargaining have a 6 or 7 percent lower probability compared with workplaces with joint
bargaining. All this is compatible with the view that such fragmented workplaces are the36
62 This figure of 7 percent is arrived as follows.  According to WERS, collective bargaining was the
dominant form of pay setting in 1998 in 29 percent of workplaces.  (Millward, Bryson, and Forth
(2000, p. 186).)   Among these workplaces, the proportion not using single table bargaining fell from
60 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 1998.  (Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, p. 203).)  Hence,
among all workplaces, the incidence of fragmented bargaining is  about 7 percent (23 percent of 29
percent).
establishments where remnants of the industrial relations climate of the 1970s live on.
Conclusion on Unionism and Productivity
A maintained hypothesis throughout this Section is that the association between Bi
on the one hand and unionism and the bargaining structure on the other hand reflects the impact of
unionism and bargaining structure on Bi .  In other words, I follow the assumption (mostly tacit) in
this literature that the relationships computed embody the effects of unionism on productivity and
on financial performance.  There is ample reason to question this maintained hypothesis: the
incidence of unionism (and different bargaining structures) may well depend on an establishment’s
productivity or financial standing so the associations computed reflect the effects of productivity (or
financial performance) on patterns of unionism and the bargaining structure.  As mentioned in the
Introduction to this paper, identifying causal relationships in these labor issues is hard.
Subject to this important qualification, this empirical research suggests that, by the
end of the 1990s, average union-nonunion differences in labor productivity appear to be negligible.
Where differences emerge, they are in those establishments with fragmented bargaining.  Such
bargaining is unusual - approximately only 7 percent of workplaces in 1998 were characterized by
fragmented bargaining.
62  This allows the generalization that unionism may serve as an agent
permitting employees to participate in shaping their work environment with little or no loss in
productivity. 
V. The Benefits of Unionism to Workers
The ultimate mission of unionism is to enhance the lot of employees in various ways.
Some of these ways are through increasing the employee’s monetary compensation.  In addition,
unions aim to increase the participation of workers in fashioning their work environment.  One
might expect that the decline in unionism in Britain over the past two decades would have been
accompanied by a fall in employees’ monetary and non-monetary rewards from work.  Is there
evidence that this has happened?
Unions and Wage Differences37
63 An important step toward that systematic explanation is supplied by Andrews, Stewart, Swaffield,
and Upward (1998) who apply different estimating procedures and specifications to a single data
set.
64 This preference derives from what seems to be the case with the U.S. research where ingenious,
sometimes baroque, estimating methods yield much more fickle and unreliable estimates than more
prosaic methods.  See Lewis (1986).  This does not mean necessarily that the same will be the case
in Britain, but it does affect the way I place my bets.
First consider the benefits from unionism as suggested by the gap between the wages
paid to unionized and to nonunionized workers.  Here there appears to be more disagreement than
there is in the United States over each economy’s patterns of union relative wage effects.  For
manual workers in Britain, the central tendency of the estimates of the gap between union and
nonunion wages was approximately ten percent in the 1980s.  This estimate varied by plant and
worker characteristics so that, for instance, it was near to zero for a very large number of
establishments, but as much as 14 percent for semi-skilled manual workers in a pre-entry closed
shop condition.  (See Stewart (1987, 1991).)  The union-nonunion wage differential is higher when
product markets are not competitive and is close to zero when product markets are competitive
(Stewart (1990)).  However, there are studies where both smaller and larger wage differentials have
been estimated (see, for instance, Andrews, Bell, and Upward (1998) and Hildreth (1999)).  Some
of these variations may be attributed to differences in the workers being studied and to control
variables used.  There is need for a systematic explanation for the variations among these
estimates.
63  
There is also not a consistent pattern regarding estimates of the change in the union-
nonunion wage gap over time.  Some researchers (e.g., Blanchflower (1999)) infer that the union-
nonunion wage gap has remained remarkably constant since the early 1980s, others suggest small
declines (e.g., Stewart (1991), Hildreth (1999)), while still others hint at rising union-nonunion wage
gaps (e.g., Andrews, Bell, and Upward (1998)).  In view of these mixed results, it is difficult to be
confident about the movements over time in union-nonunion wages.  However, I am inclined to
accept the implications from the more straightforward computations (such as those of Blanchflower
(1999)) that suggest small variations over time  in union-nonunion wage gaps.
64 If this is true, then
is this stability in the face of declining unionism a paradox?  Not necessarily: suppose union-
nonunion wage gaps in 1980 varied across workplaces and suppose workplaces where these gaps
were least have dropped out of the union sector; then declining unionism will be accompanied by38
65 The unfavorable percentage response in 1996 for “poor employee relations” is significantly greater
than that for 1983 on a standard normal test while the response in 1996 for “not well managed” is
not significantly different from the response in 1983.  Regardless, the argument in the text is that
the changes between 1983 and 1996 are very much smaller than the retreat of unionism.
rising union-nonunion wage gaps.  This example illustrates how the changing composition of
workplaces in the union sector may yield average union-nonunion wage differentials that are rising,
falling, or constant over time.  But taken at face value, the typical union worker’s higher pay over
his non-union counterpart has changed little over the past twenty years.  Or expressed differently,
for those who believe that unions raise the pay of nonunion workers as well as those of union
workers, the decline in unionism since the late 1970s has not hurt the average nonunion worker’s
pay any more than the average union worker’s pay.
Unions and Work Life
Consider now some non-monetary aspects of the work environment.  Drawing on
data from the repeated British Social Attitudes surveys, Figure 7 graphs the percentage of employees
who give unfavorable responses to questions regarding labor relations and the quality of
management.  For instance, the series “poor employee relations” measures the percentage of
employees who believe they work at establishments where labor relations are unsatisfactory.  The
series “not well managed” measures the percentage of employees who have unfavorable views of
the quality of management at their place of work.  These two series may have drifted up slightly over
the decade since 1983, but whatever changes there have been look very small by comparison with
the decline of unionism.
65 Not surprisingly, the percentage of employees who believe they have no
voice in workplace decisions (given by the series “no say in work decisions”) has risen although
again the change is very much smaller than the drop in union representation and most of the change
took place in the 1980s, not the 1990s as unionism continued its retreat.  Given the sharp drop in
union density over this same period from the 1980s to mid-1990s, the absence of a strong movement
in these perceptions is noteworthy. 
The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey reported that about half of
employees felt managers treated them fairly and that 65 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they
felt loyalty toward the organization they worked for.  (See Cully at al. (1999), Table 8.3 and Figure
8.6.)  A suppressed resentment of management is not evident from these figures.  Workers are much
more likely to have unfavorable attitudes regarding labor relations at their place of work if those
workplaces were unionized.  Employees at establishments with no worker representation were most39
66 It has sometimes been argued that unions are inclined to make workers more aware of
shortcomings in their work environment and this explains why union members tend to report less
favorable labor relations.  However, in the 1999 British Social Attitudes survey, non-members
working in unionized workplaces had significantly less favorable perceptions on labor relations than
non-members in workplaces without unions.  See Bryson (1999). 
67 In fact, employees were divided into three groups: union members; never union members; and
those who were once union members, but are no longer union members.  When asked whether
“unions make a difference to what it is like at work”, 46 percent of current union members agreed,
30 percent of never union members agreed, and 26 percent of former union members agreed.   In a
separate survey, “...participation through union representation was associated with a generally more
negative view of the effectiveness of work arrangements” (Gallie, White, Cheng, and Tomlinson
(1998, p. 113)).
likely to see their industrial relations as “very good”.
66 
Moreover, the belief that unions make a meaningful difference to work life is not
widely maintained: 46 percent of union members and only 30 percent of nonunion members believe
that unions make a difference to what it is like at work.
67    Even among union members in
recognized workplaces, about the same fraction felt the union was no better at representing an
employee’s interests about work complaints than the individual himself.  (See Tables 9.6 and 9.7
of Cully et al. (1999).)  In the 1999 British Social Attitudes survey, among employees in unionized
workplaces, less than two in five (37 percent) felt the union helped in running the establishment.
(Bryson (1999).)  Though there are some exceptions, the fall in unionism within continuing
workplaces in the private sector is not attributable to management’s hostility to unions, but to “a
withering of support for membership among the existing workforce, plus a lack of recruitment as
the workforce evolved” (Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, p. 92).  Management attributed the
decline in the recognition of unions at the workplace to a drop in employees’ interest in union
representation and to a rethinking of policies toward employee relations by management.  (Millward,
Bryson, and Forth (2000, p. 105.)
The impression from these figures is that unions are not being successful in persuading employees
that they need union representation so there is little in these numbers to support Towers’ (1997)
claim that there is a serious representation gap in British workplaces. 
One reason why workers appear not to have grieved over the loss of union
representation is that various “direct” forms of participation - workplace meetings, briefing groups,
and problem-solving groups - have grown in place of “indirect” forms such as unions and40
consultative committees.  Asking employees for their assessment of the effectiveness of these direct
mechanisms, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, pp.128-35) find that these nonunion voice
mechanisms seem to work well in informing employees of proposed workplace changes and in
making management responsive to suggestions from employees. On only one dimension - whether
workers feel they are being treated fairly by management - is it the case that unionized workers
(when represented on a consultative committee) are more satisfied with their workplace environment
than nonunion workers with these “direct” forms of representation.  Though unions may derive
solace from this result, what is striking is that this is the only issue on which unionism scores
significantly better than these other mechanisms.  Moreover, it is not unionism per se that produces
this result, but the combination of union recognition and union presence on a consultative
committee, a combination found in merely four percent of workplaces in 1998.    
These findings should be of real concern to union leaders.  To express the issue
starkly, they raise the question of whether unions are becoming irrelevant.  Instead of interacting
with the agents of the union, management (especially in the private sector) are making use of other
means to communicate with their employees, many of whom have ambivalent feelings about unions.
Neither workers nor employers are expressing strong preferences for the need for unionism at the
workplace.  While the Gallup Opinion Poll reports general sympathy (and growing approval in the
1990s - see Figure 3) among all adults for the activities of unions, this does not appear to translate
into a great unmet need among workers for union organization.  Unions have lost five-and-a-half
million members since 1979 and yet the labor force appears not to be clamouring for much more
representation.  
VI. A Summing-Up
The British experience over the past forty years or so offers an opportunity to draw
some particular conclusions about unions in Britain and also to speculate on unionism in general.
First, what explains the retreat of unionism in Britain?  The changed legal framework
for unionism provides an obvious explanation.  However, laws never operate in a vacuum, but in a
particular context and the context defines their impact.  It is the context that accounts for the fact that
the legal changes introduced by Heath’s government in the early 1970s failed to reform industrial
relations.  What are the principal features of the 1980s and 1990s context that explains why the
changed legal environment had so much bite?  
One feature is the abandonment in the 1980s of the goal of full employment macro-41
68 Other assessments of the causes of the decline in unionism have come to conclusions consistent
with this.  Thus, Brown and Wadhwani (1990) conclude, “...the driving force behind changes in
industrial relations practices in the 1980s....has been increased product market competition,
precipitated by a variety of circumstance, which has obliged employers to put their own houses in
order” (p. 68).  In the same vein, Dunn and Metcalf (1996) determine that “....unemployment,
including two deep recessions, and stiffer product market competition remain of paramount
importance in weakening unions and stimulating management.....where we can pinpoint the law’s
impact, legislative intrusion does not automatically bring the expected economic changes.  Notably,
when management eliminated closed shops in favour of merely recommending union membership,
some economic consequences of ‘compulsory’ unionism survived.” (p.93).  Haskel’s (1991)
empirical analysis of labor productivity growth in 81 manufacturing industries from 1980 to 1986
suggests that the effects of greater product market competition were transferred to the labor market
by shedding  productivity-restraining practices.
economic policies which meant that organized labor operated in a much more inhospitable
environment.  The second key feature is that the rigors of considerably greater product market
competition in the 1980s and 1990s were transmitted to labor markets as firms recognized the
necessity of reforming their labor practices.  The new legal backdrop permitted managements to take
charge of industrial relations, the “harder” product market environment made the reform of labor
relations practices urgent, and the increased unemployment weakened the ability of unions to resist
them.  Above all, the legal framework allowed new firms greater flexibility in choosing labor
relations procedures that fitted their circumstances and, in fact, these procedures often involved no
union presence.  According to this argument, the new legislative framework of the 1980s and 1990s
permitted the development of a new climate of industrial relations policies, but it was the
renunciation of full employment goals and the harsher competitive environment that complemented
the new legal setting and produced unionism’s decline.
68 
How did the decline in unionism affect the growth and distribution of incomes?  The
growth in real incomes ultimately matches the growth in productivity and there is some slight
evidence that the decline in unionism contributed to faster growth than would have otherwise
occurred. It was argued above that, by the end of the 1990s, the association between unionism and
low labor productivity appears to have been broken except in those workplaces where many unions
bargain separately.  Such fragmented bargaining is now unusual so that, in general, unions are no
longer a factor depressing labor productivity.
With respect to the distribution of incomes, the sharp rise in wage inequality
coincides with the decline in unionism and it is difficult to resist the temptation to link the two. This42
69 The NMW was introduced at £3.60 for those aged 21 years and over and at £3.20 for those aged
18-20 years.  Metcalf (1999) estimates the NMW affected 8 percent of previously employed
workers.
70 If the union can show that a majority of workers in the bargaining unit are union members, no
representation election is needed and the union will be granted bargaining rights.
presents the familiar dilemma: suppose the decline of unionism contributed, first, to a faster growth
in productivity and thus in income and, second, to greater inequality in incomes; is greater income
inequality at a higher level of real income preferred to narrower inequality at a lower level of
income? 
How has the decline in unionism affected the workplace experience of employees?
Given the sharp reduction in union representation, the change in indicators of the quality of work
life has been surprisingly small.  There does not appear to be a pervasive, unmet, demand for union
representation.  On the contrary, the creation of new “direct” forms of communication between
management and employees have made many workers believe that union representation is
unnecessary.  Increasingly, unions are returning to their nineteenth century role as “friendly
societies” providing members with personal services such as group insurance policies, adult learning
opportunities, and legal advice.
Although the statutory agenda of the Conservative Governments’ approach to labor
markets in the 1980s and 1990s was contentious at the time of its introduction, today much of it has
passed into general acceptance.  What has not been accepted?  First the removal of wage floors by
abolishing Wages Councils at a time when the wage structure widened considerably has left
observers disturbed by the consequences for low paid workers of unregulated labor markets.  The
response has been the imposition of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999.  Introduced
at a time when general unemployment is not regarded as a principal policy problem, there appears
remarkable agreement on the value of a NMW.  In part this is a by-product of the fact that it has
been set at a level that risks only small employment consequences.
69
The second area of policy disagreement with the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s
concerns procedures for the recognition of unions in workplaces.  To address this, in situations
where an employer rejects a union’s request for recognition, the current Labour Government
proposes a version of the North American system of representational elections.
70  How this will
change the climate of industrial relations and the extent of unionism is difficult to forecast.  Much43
71 The unemployment rates of men are used to avoid the persistent differences among countries in
the propensity of women to work   In fact, it would be better to use not merely unemployment rates
to measure labor utilization rates, but also employment propensities, hours of work, and early
retirement rates.  Earnings inequality usually changes slowly while cyclical movements in
unemployment rates are much more evident  Therefore, the association between unemployment
changes and wage inequality changes is much more sensitive to choice of the year to compute
unemployment rate changes than earnings inequality changes.  Presumably “permanent”
unemployment rates and other measures of labor utilization should be used, not those in column (1)
of Table 8.
72 Some smaller economies do not conform easily to this story.  Thus, New Zealand provides an
example of an economy where both unemployment and earnings inequality have increased while
the extent of collective bargaining has fallen considerably. In the Netherlands, unemployment has
not risen while earnings inequality and the coverage of collective bargaining agreements have
changed little.  The trade-offs suggested in Table 8 seem more evident in the larger than the smaller
economies.
depends on the precise operation of the system.  However, even with the cooperation and goodwill
of employers, if the evidence brought forward in Section V above is correct, workers’ attitudes
toward unions need to become more favorable before the drop in union representation is reversed.
There is no general nostalgia for the 1970s brand of unionism in Britain.  There is
a sense that British labor markets are working more effectively than some on the European
Continent.  The drop in unemployment in Britain compared with Continental Europe is sometimes
attributed to a delayed reaction to the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s.  Cross-country
comparisons are fraught with difficulties, but among large economies there does seem to be a pattern
such that those countries that have avoided increases in unemployment have done so only at the cost
of greater earnings inequality.  And this trade-off seems to be related to changes in collective
bargaining: unemployment has tended to increase least where collective bargaining has shrunk the
most.  This is suggested by the data in Table 8 which lists changes in male unemployment rates,
changes in male earnings inequality, and changes in the coverage of collective bargaining contracts
in nine major economies.
71  Figure 8 graphs the relationship between unemployment changes and
changes in collective bargaining for these nine countries: where the range of collective bargaining
contracts has grown (in France, Sweden, and Germany), unemployment rates have increased the
most; where the coverage of collective bargaining has contracted (Britain and the United States),
unemployment rates have increased least.
72  It appears as if, over the past twenty years or so,44
competitive and technological pressures on labor markets have tended to manifest themselves in
changes in labor utilization in economies where government and labor union wage-setting
institutions are extensive and in earnings inequality where these wage-setting institutions are less
intrusive or where they have been brushed aside.  
This is a sweeping simplification of a much more complex situation.  Though this
emphasizes the similarity of the experience of British and U.S. labor markets, there are very
important differences.  For instance, it appears as if flows of individuals into and out of
unemployment in Britain are nothing like as large as those in the United States.  Also the increases
in earnings inequality in Britain and the U.S. are around different trends in real wages, rising trends
at the tenth earnings decile in Britain and falling trends at the tenth earnings decile in the United
States.  Moreover, while the case for a “representation gap” may be moot for Britain, it is far less
so for the United States.  (See Freeman and Rogers (1999).)  Further, Britain’s place in the European
Union points to the likelihood of new regulatory initiatives in the future including a growing role
for Works Councils.  All this cautions against simple classifications of countries that gloss over the
richness of experiences.
However, it is palpable that British labor markets look far less “corporatist”, far more
like textbook competitive markets, than they did at the close of the 1970s.  And the retreat of
unionism is very much a part of this change.  Indeed, because British labor markets today have a
much more exacting competitive character, unions in the future will need to run much faster to stay
in the same place.  The relentless decline of unionism in Britain since 1979 testifies to its somewhat
fragile character.  The decline cannot be traced to a single event or circumstance yet, bit-by-bit,
through a slow yet inexorable process, British unionism has become marginalized in the private
sector of the economy.  Given the birth and death character of firms in a market economy, when the
locus of unionism is at the workplace, unionism must constantly recruit new members and organize
new firms simply to stay in the same place.  To extend their reach, unions have to run even faster,
something that has happened neither in Britain nor in the United States.  The new environment that
will change this is not at all evident.  Yet it seems to be in the nature of unionism that its cycles of
growth and decline are often unexpected.  Perhaps a period of union growth in Britain (instigated
by the growing influence of European Union legislation) is just around the corner.  If so, it will be
another surprise.45
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Figure 1
Source: Data drawn from issues of the Employment Gazette and Labour Market Trends.52
Figure 2
Source: Data on stoppages are taken from issues of the Employment Gazette and Labour Market
Trends.53
Figure 3
Percentage responding “a good thing”, “a bad thing”, and “don’t know” (or refused to respond) to
the question, “Generally speaking, do you think trade unions are a good thing or a bad thing?”.
There were two surveys in 1974 and the entry in the graph for this year is a simple average of the
two responses.  Source: The Gallup Political and Economic Index, the Gallup Organization and the
Daily Telegraph.54
Figure 4
U.K. Unemployment Rate, Absolute and Relative to Unemployment Rates 
in the U.S. and France, 1970-99
Source: The unemployment rates in this graph are “standardised” unemployment rates from the





tes to Figure 7.  The series measuring employees’ perceptions are drawn from Bryson and McKay
(1997).  Union density data are the same as those graphed in Figure 1.  
The series “poor employee relations” measures the percentage of employees who respond “not very”
or “not at all” good to the question: In general, how would you describe relations between
management and other employees at your workplace: very good, quite good, not very good, or not
at all good?  The values for 1988 and 1992 are interpolated.
The series “not well managed” measures the percentage of employees who respond “not well
managed” to the question: In general, would you say your workplace was very well managed, quite
well managed, or not well managed?  The values for 1988 and 1992 are interpolated.
The series “no say in work decisions” measures the percentage of employees who respond “no say”
when asked: Suppose there was going to be some decision made at your place of work that changed
the way you do your job.  Do you think that you personally would have any say in the decision about
the change or not? The values for 1986, 1988, 1990,1992, 1994, and 1995 are interpolated.58
Figure 8
Changes in Unemployment Rates and in the Coverage of Collective Bargaining Contracts:
Selected Countries
Sources: See beneath Table 8.59
Table 1
Working Days Lost through Stoppages per Thousand Employees 
in all Industries and Services, Annual Averages1971-80
country
years
1979 1971-75 1976-80 1971-80
United Kingdom 1,291 585 566 575
Australia 795 728 596 662
Belgium 199 236 219 228
Canada 837 919 864 892
Denmark 83 436 92 264
Finland 133 753 615 684
France 207 232 186 209
W e s t  G e r m a n y 2 25 75 25 4
Ireland 1,757 415 1,064 739
Italy 1,659 1,367 1,174 1,271
Japan 24 188 43 115
Netherlands 77 43 30 37
New Zealand 373 150 378 264
Norway 4 52 42 47
Spain 2,288 141 1,749 856
Sweden 7 85 241 163
United States 388 484 420 452
Source: Employment Gazette, February 1982, p.69.  Stoppages cover both strikes and lock-outs.
Definitions and coverage of stoppages vary across countries so these data should not be relied upon
to justify strong inferences about inter-country differences. 60
Table 2
Union Membership Density by Various Characteristics, 1979 and 1999
1979 1999 1979 1999
by gender: by region:
     male 63 31     East Anglia 40 23
     female 40 28     South-East 43 22
    Greater London 47 27
by occupation:     South West 55 26
     manual 63 30     East Midlands 61 30
     non-manual 44 31     Yorks. & Humber 67 34
    North West 71 34
by broad industry:     North East 72 40
     manufacturing 70 28     Wales 71 39
     construction 37 21     Scotland 63 35
     distribution 15 12
     health services 74 45 by sector:
    private sector 43 19
    public sector 82 60
Source: The data for 1979 are taken from Price and Bain (1983) except for the regional data that are
from Millward and Stevens (1988).  The regional data are for 1984.  (The South East excludes
Greater London.)  The data for 1999 are from Hicks (2000).  These three sources define union
density differently and the delineation of the regions is not the same for the two years.  61
Table 3
Working Days Lost through Stoppages per Thousand Employees 
in all Industries and Services, Annual Averages1981-98
country
years
1981-85 1986-90 1989-93 1994-98 (1994-98)/
(1976-80)
United Kingdom 442 137 72 22 0.04
Australia 386 224 179 91 0.15
Belgium 48 37 80 0.37
Canada 498 429 255 215 0.25
Denmark 306 41 34 309 3.36
Finland 326 410 174 182 0.30
France 84 111 34 39 0.21
West Germany 50 5 19 4 0.08
Ireland 474 242 143 73 0.07
Italy 774 315 250 112 0.10
Japan 10 5 3 2 0.05
Netherlands 24 13 16 26 0.87
New Zealand 408 425 130 30 0.08
Norway 58 142 63 99 0.47
Spain 584 602 428 267 0.31
Sweden 40 134 73 43 0.26
United States 128 82 65 43 0.10
OECD Average 161 86 52
Source: Employment Gazette, December 1991, p. 653, Labour Market Trends, April 1997, p. 130,
and Labour Market Trends, April 2000, p. 148.  Stoppages cover both strikes and lock-outs.
Definitions and coverage of stoppages vary across countries so these data should not be relied upon
to justify strong inferences about inter-country differences. 62
Table 4
Cross Classification of Workplaces by Labor Productivity and Financial Performance, 1998
        labor
         product-  



















22 5 4 6 1 45 9 2
average 1 28 343 143 12 527
better than
average
2 13 209 337 41 602
a lot better
than average
0 2 39 98 115 254
total 9 70 637 595 173 1,48463
Table 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Effects of Unionism and Bargaining Structure 
on Labor Productivity and Financial Performance
(Estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.)
1998 Survey 1990 Survey





























































Implications of Estimates for Differences in Labor Productivity and Financial Performance 
by Union and Bargaining Status





























0 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
prob(average) 0 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
prob(better than
average)
-0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
prob(a lot better
than average)




0 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.01
prob(below
average)
0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02
prob(average) 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.04
prob(better than
average)
-0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
prob(a lot better
than average)
-0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.0765
Table 7
Cross Classification of Workplaces by Labor Productivity and Financial Performance, 1990
        labor
         product-  




















average 1 11 72 38 11 133
better than
average
01 0 2 7 2 9 2 6 9 2
a lot better
than average
0 5 38 68 10 121
total 1 37 150 142 50 38066
Table 8
Changes in Male Unemployment Rates, Male Earnings Inequality, and the Coverage of Collective













Australia 0.50 7.30 -9.09
Canada 0.20 8.96 -2.70
France 1.58 1.18 11.76
Germany 2.32 -5.46 1.10
Italy 0.88 15.28 -3.53
Sweden 2.95 4.46 3.49
Japan 1.27 6.95 -25.00
United Kingdom 0.24 36.78 -32.86
U.S.A. -0.18 36.79 -30.49
Definitions and Sources
Column (1).  Let U(i, t) be the male unemployment percentage of country i in year t.  Column (1)
lists [U(i,1999) - U(i,1979)]/U(i,1979).  The data are drawn from the September 1983 and June 2000
issues of OECD’s Employment Outlook.
Column (2). Let D(i,t) be the ratio in year t and in country i of the earnings of male workers at the
90
th percentile to the earnings of male workers at the 10
th percentile.  Column (2) lists
100*[D(i,1995) - D(i,1979)]/D(i,1979).  The data are drawn from the July 1996 issue of OECD’s
Employment Outlook.
Column (3).  Let C(i,t) be the percentage of workers in country i and year t covered by collective
bargaining contracts.  Column (3) lists 100*[C(i,1994) - C(i,1980)]/C(i,1980).  The data are drawn
from the July 1997 of  OECD’s Employment Outlook.